The other day on /r/debatereligion, someone posted this infographic and asked atheists to defeat it. I have not read anyone else's comments yet, and I thought it would be a fun exercise to make a stab at it. I have no idea if this is the best presentation of the Unmoved Mover argument or if Aquinas himself would agree. I am just responding to it as it appears here.
1. On the second panel, a note is made that Aquinas was not arguing for a beginning to the universe, but rather for a causal power that is operating right now. This is important later. Furthermore, I fundamentally disagree with the quote on this panel from Summa Theologica, but it is completely tangential to the argument and my rebuttal, so I will leave it.
2. "Motion" means "change", which means conversion from "potential" to "actual". Throughout the graphic, the words "potential" and "actual" are used to refer to these kinds of things. The author is equivocating here on the terms "potential"and "actual", as he uses them as adjectives (as he ought) as well as nouns, which is questionable. Still, this problem could be fixed with some clarification, but I understand that he wanted to avoid unnecessary wordage, so I will follow his form.
3. On panel 5, it is stated that "a potential cannot do anything, because it is not an actual. Because potentials cannot do anything, they cannot make themselves actual." This may be true when we are talking about physical objects taking different forms (like water turning into ice or seeds turning into a rose). However, not every "thing" must be a physical object. It is possible to talk about an event as a potential. For example, an event can potentially cease to happen. In this case, the event will realize its own potential once the happening of the event is finished, without the need to be actualized by something else. This is the most important point, which will become apparent later.
4. On panel 7, the argument is made for a chain of dependence (actuals actualizing potentials in a linear fashion) that is happening right now, in the present. I agree with this chain of dependence, but I contest that it must be operating right now. It is physically impossible for a cause and effect to happen simultaneously. A cause must come first, and then, after a period of time, the effect occurs. It can also be the case where a cause can effect, cease to exist, and then afterwards the effect still takes place.
The example used here is of the form: power plant -> freezer -> cold air -> ice. The power plant could cause the freezer to run which can cause the air to become cold. But, because it takes more than a miniscule amount of time for water to freeze, the plant or the freezer could cease to exist (or more simply, stop working), but the ice would still freeze because the air is still cold. Moreover, the air could freeze the ice, cease to be cold, and the ice would still exist (at least for a time). Things take time, so not all causes and effects must happen close together.
5. On panel 9, the assertion is made that this dependence chain cannot be infinitely long, for "an infinite number of inert members cannot do anything". I think this is an unbased assumption and do not find the argument convincing, especially since there is no argument here, only examples. At any rate, I am willing to concede this point for the sake of argument, because it ultimately has no bearing on my counter-argument.
6. On panel 10, the assertion is made that, since the chain cannot be infinitely long, there must be one member at the head of the chain that drives the whole thing. This does naturally follow, except for the part about the "one". If every effect were caused by one and only one cause, then this would be true. But in the real world, effects can (and usually do) have multiple causes. Consider rolling a boulder. One person cannot roll the boulder, nor can two, but three people can. The three people are not chained together (as in, they do not cause or affect each other), but all three people simultaneously pushing on the boulder do affect the boulder's motion. Though the people are not dependent on each other, take any one person out and the effect ceases to happen. This can extend all the way to the beginning of the chain, such that the chain could have multiple uncaused "heads" that all converge to produce a singular effect.
7. On panel 11, the author introduces a definition, and this is where the argument really starts to break down. The definition (which I am perfectly ok with, as long as the word is used consistently) is thus: "Since the chain must have a first member at the head of it, that member must be purely actual." I take it to mean, then, that purely actual is defined as "the head of the chain of dependence", or "something which has no cause" or even more accurately, "an actual that never once was a potential."
On the next panel (12), however, unbased assumptions are made about the attributes of a thing that is purely actual. These attributes are entirely based on the premise that a purely actual thing has no "unrealized potentials." Examples of "unrealized potentials" are not being able to do something, a change in location or form, coming into or going out of being, or lacking knowledge.
In order to make this argument work, great care must be taken in defining what exactly an "unrealized potential" is, and this is perhaps the most confusing part of the whole argument. Taking the language at face value, I would define an "unrealized potential" as a potential thing (some object or form that could exist, but doesn't) that has not (yet) been actualized. Here, I am effectively equating unrealized with unactualized. (If a better definition of unrealized is available, I would love to hear it.)
For an example of an unrealized potential as I am defining it, consider the water again. Here is a labeling of the various actuals and potentials in this situation:
cold air: actual (non-pure, because it was once a potential that has been actualized)
water: potential-ice
water: potential-steam
-> (let time pass)
cold air: actual (as before)
ice: actual (used to be water: potential-ice)
steam: N/A (doesn't exist; unrealized potential)
In this example, the steam is never actualized, so the water has an "unrealized potential". Now back to the definition of pure actual. A pure actual is something that never was a potential. Notice the difference here. Just because an actual was never actualized from a potential does not mean that it does not have any unrealized potentials. It is still possible, in other words, for the head of the chain of dependence to have the possibility of moving or of changing forms after the chain was started (effectively forming two chains).
The point of the matter is this. The Unmoved Mover argument makes the claim that a pure actual, the head of the chain, cannot have unrealized potentials, and so must be existent, omnipotent, non-physical, eternal, omniscient, perfect, immutable, and the only one. Ergo, God. However, nowhere does it follow that something which didn't have a cause cannot have unrealized potentials. Nor does it follow that a pure actual cannot cause an effect and then realize a potential after the fact. When we trace the causality of things back to the very beginning, it is not necessary for the head of the chain to still be around after the first cause; it could have still caused one thing and then realized a potential (such as ceasing to exist) after it did its initial cause.
Consider the Big Bang. If we scientifically trace all cause and effect back far enough, we get to the Big Bang. Like the concept of God, there is no requirement that the Big Bang was caused by anything (or in other words, it is a pure actual, merely by the fact that it never was a potential). The Big Bang, being in nature an "event", can obviously have potentials (such as ceasing to exist), but the fact that it has potentials does not stop it from being the head of the chain. Realizing the potential of not-existing does not require a separate actual in order to actualize it. (See talking point #3 above.)
So to summarize, I find two main flaws with this argument.
1. Dependence chains are not linear; not only can multiple actuals actualize one potential, but one actual can actualize multiple potentials. The chain both converges and diverges.
2. Not all potentials require a separate actual to actualize them. For instance, the Big Bang can exist as a pure actual (uncaused), cause a chain of dependence (the universe), and then cease to exist as an event. It need not be omnipotent, non-physical, eternal, omniscient, perfect, immutable, or the only one to be at the head of the chain.
TL;DR version
The Unmoved Mover argument says that everything that happens is caused by something else. If we trace these cause-and-effects all the way back to the beginning, we end up with "the thing" that is ultimately responsible for everything else. By nature of being the first thing, it is uncaused, and just by nature of being uncaused, it cannot be changed or transformed in any way, so it must be God. I have shown that the first thing could be the Big Bang and then, despite having no cause, cause itself to be something that it is not (namely, a thing that doesn't exist).
ELI5 version
Everything happens for a reason, except for the first thing that ever happened, which we call God. But the first thing that ever happened could have been the Big Bang, which isn't God. This makes a lot more sense, so it's probably true.
Other Responses
There are tons of other ways of approaching this issue, so I will let others' comments speak for themselves. A couple of my favorites are khafra's and tannat's. Now that my brain is fried, time to go back to work!
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